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Evolution of the Daimyo
The daimyo were Japanese warlords who ruled their individual domains during
the time of the Shogun. The term literally means "great name," but
the second character is an abbreviation of "private land," so the term
loosely translates to "major landholder." In terms of titles, the
daimyo is equivalent to a feudal lord.
Aristocratic Period
to 1192
The daimyo rose during a period of aristocracy and
came of age when the feudal era began in Japan with the rise of the samurai
class during the 12th century. During the 10th and 11th centuries, the
aristocrats in Kyoto devoted their energies more to poetry, literature, and
amorous adventuring than to governing. The provincial aristocrats, meanwhile,
were gaining practical experience managing their rural estates, and controlling
the peasants on them, with little direction and control from the capital. They
ruled from horseback and practiced with the sword and the bow. They wore armor
made from small strips of metal, and were counterparts of early knights of feudal
Europe. The Imperial Court and the central monasteries nominally owned the
provincial estates, but they depended on the local aristocratic clans to collect
taxes. To keep the peace in the provinces, the clans trained warriors to protect themselves from
those who would disrupt their authority. The provincial governors formed alliances with each other
for mutual protection, and to further common interests. They intermarried and
formed lasting relationships. This occurred most prominently towards the east,
in the rich plains of Kanto (area around present-day Tokyo), where the
warrior-chieftains were
continually campaigning against the aboriginal Ainu in the northern part of the
island. The courtiers of the Imperial Court, who had limited military skills,
from time to time would bring provincial warriors to the capital to help protect
their interests, and to display their power and influence. The monasteries in
Kyoto did the same with warriors from their own estates to help force their will
upon the Court aristocrats. Eventually factional disputes over Imperial
succession or other conflicts among the Court nobles would initiate actual
combat. In the middle of the 12th century, a succession dispute led to
large-scale clashes between two rival Court factions and their warrior
supporters. The warrior clans were two great provincial families, the Minamoto,
based in the Kanto region of eastern Japan, and the Taira, who were the power of
the Inland Sea region. Both families had descended from cadet branches of the Imperial family who had sought their fortunes in the provinces. They merged and
formed alliances with other local aristocrats and rose to leadership among them
due to their prestige as descendants of Emperors. In 1160 the Taira prevailed.
Its leader, Kiyomori, realized that his army of allies were now the paramount
military force in the land, and that the Emperor and the Imperial Court were
powerless in their hands. Kiyomori and his generals settled down in Kyoto, and
took control of the Court and the country. By staying in Kyoto, Kiyomori began
to lose control of the provinces. The district governors became more independent. Taira's old enemy, the Minamoto, rose to power again in the Kanto
region. Kamakura Shogunate
1192-1333
The period of military dictatorship in Japan began in 1192, after the
Genpei War, when Minamoto
Yoritomo became the Empire's 1st Shogun after a decisive naval battle
over the rival Taira clan on the Inland Sea at Dan-no-ura, a significant event in samurai history. The
title Shogun, officially Seii Taishogun, was originally a temporary post bestowed on military
commanders who were empowered to fight the Ainu up north, and the sword of
office was surrendered once the frontier campaign was over. Yoritomo placed a
child of 4 years on the Chrysanthemum Throne and assumed the title of Shogun. Yoritomo however
kept the title for life and made it hereditary by abdicating his post prior to
his death and bestowing it to his eldest son and heir. The transition to military rule required
some degree of Imperial support as the provincial aristocrats technically managed their
estates on behalf of the Imperial Court. Yoritomo needed Imperial mandates to
his power to gain support, or at least compliance, from the rural governors. In
return for relinquishing ultimate administrative power, Yoritomo guaranteed that
the nobles and the clergy would continue receiving income based on their
position and status, and retain their traditional role as social, cultural, and
religious leaders. Yoritomo, who himself claimed aristocratic descent, and
had certain respect for the Imperial family, now ruled the country on behalf of the
Court. The Imperial Court thus held no governing power, and very little
influence, and were relegated to ceremonial duties. This state of affairs lasted
throughout the era of the samurai, where control of the Imperial Court meant
control of the government. Intent on not making the same mistake as Kiyomori, Yoritomo set up his
Bakufu, or military headquarters in Kamakura (near present-day Tokyo), far from Kyoto, and ruled from there,
effectively setting up a second seat of government that held the real power.
From there Yoritomo proved himself to be an effective politician and a genius at
administration. The samurai was now the only class that really mattered, and an
office called the samurai-dokoro now dealt with all matters regarding the
military class. The new administration appointed government officials, handed
out promotions, and judged lawsuits far more fairly than the previous court. Estates and manors were surveyed for production value, and taxes were set.
The era of samurai rule began, and the
provincial governors came to be known as daimyo and became hereditary
landowners. Yoritomo's sons, however, were not as assertive as their
father. After Yoritomo's death in 1199, his strong-willed wife supported her
relatives, the Hojo clan, descendants of the Taira, to administer the land on behalf of the Shogun.
This led to the elimination of the main
Minamoto line. The Hojo placed puppets on the position of Shogun, chosen from aristocratic
families, and contented themselves to rule as Shikken "Regent to the Shogun." The Kamakura
Bakufu lasted 150 years.
During this time, it was customary for a landowner to divide his holdings among
all his sons. In time, this led to smaller and smaller income for each heir and
resulted in an ever weaker military class. In 1274 and 1281, the Mongols
attempted to invade and conquer Japan. Though the invasion failed, there were no
spoils to divide among the victors, and many warrior clans became impoverished
during the long months away from home in the service of Kamakura. A spark was lit by a renegade
Emperor, Go-Daigo,
who gathered dissatisfied forces in the west to restore Imperial rule and led a
revolt against Kamakura in 1331. A general from the east, Ashikaga Takauji, was
sent to quell the uprising. In 1333, however, Takauji switched sides, seized
Kamakura, and destroyed the Hojo clan, ending Kamakura rule. Ashikaga
Shogunate
1338-1573
Ashikaga Takauji had himself appointed Shogun in 1338 and became the 1st
Ashikaga ruler of Japan. The treacherous Ashikaga clan never restored Imperial
rule, and Go-Daigo's line never sat on the throne again. The time of the
Ashikaga Shogunate was an era of chaos. War was virtually constant. Warrior
generals of both sides appropriated estates of absentee aristocrats and
distributed them to their followers. Both the Bakufu and the Imperial Court
appropriated half the rents of estates for the use of local warriors. Local
warriors eventually took control of the land. They no longer paid rent to a higher up
right-holder, and they used the entire wealth of the land to equip themselves and
attract followers. Land was transferred from one warrior to another among
themselves without regard to the original estate proprietor. Real test of
ownership was not an estate charter, but the ability to protect oneself against
encroachment, which meant armed occupancy of the land. The local warrior class
became far less controllable and far more independent than ever before. Firmly
attached to their land and interests of their locality, they became to be
referred to as ji-samurai "landed warriors." Clans would band together to protect
themselves from outside intrusion, or to revolt against the Bakufu's
representatives. When Ashikaga Takauji became Shogun he appointed many
of his kin to the office of constable. In areas where a powerful local family
already held sway, he often confirmed its power by naming the head of the family
to the position. It was through the constables that early Ashikaga Shogun waged
civil war. They were given the power to raise taxes, settle local land disputes,
appropriate confiscated lands, and carry out other judicial functions.
Ostensively, the constable exercised his powers at the pleasure of the Bakufu,
but he usually looked after his own interests more than those of the Shogun,
including the expansion of his own landholdings. The stronger constables,
backed by his official powers and sustained by extensive landholdings,
frequently tried to sway local warriors to be his personal vassal. Although he
was not always successful, as many warriors had gained considerable independence
through local warfare and the expropriation of estates, it was not uncommon
for a constable to be able to raise an army in time of war or to protect land
rights. To gain followers, the constable would often establish members of branch
families as landholders in their province or form ties with unrelated families
through marriage. There was no longer a national network of vassals loyal to the
Ashikaga Shogunate. The power rested with the constable families who exercised
near-autonomous control over the provinces under their supervision. In theory,
the constables owed allegiance to the Shogun who appointed them, and many were
indeed from Ashikaga branch families, but in practice, the constables treated
the Shogun less as their lord than as a slightly more prestigious equal, at
least within their respective provinces. None, however, tried to usurp or
overthrow the power of the Bakufu as any attempt to do so would not have been
tolerated by the other constables. The balance of power between the Bakufu,
the constables, and the local warriors was not a stable one. The constables were
not feudal lords in complete control of the provinces they nominally governed.
They did not hold complete propriety rights over the land in their provinces,
nor did they command the allegiance of all the local warriors. Their landholdings were frequently scattered over several provinces. The constables
maintained residences in the provinces, but they started to stay more in Kyoto
to nurture their influence at the capital. Instead of governing directly, they
relied on deputies, sometimes from branch families, to manage local
administration. By the time of the Ashikaga Shogunate, the practice of equal
inheritance had been abandoned in the higher reaches of warrior society and one
son was chosen as both the head of the family and inheritor of all the family
holdings. This resulted in recurring outbreaks of succession disputes within
families, which routinely turned into armed conflicts. In these clashes, local
warriors would throw their support behind one side or the other, and constables
in neighboring provinces would regularly interfere as well. In 1467 the Onin
War broke out when there was a succession dispute over the next Ashikaga Shogun.
Two major constables, the Yamana and the Hosokawa, took opposing sides. The
region around Kyoto was battlegrounds for nearly a decade. The capital was
fought over, looted, and burned time after time. The estates of the Imperial
family were seized by local warriors or their chieftains. The aristocracy became
impoverished and found their very lives in danger. Many fled to the provinces to
live on any lands they still had left. The war left the country without an
effective central power for almost a century. The Onin War exhausted the energy and resources of the
provincial constable families. Although many were able to keep their
landholdings, the warrior class took the opportunity to rebel against their
authority. Within a generation, the constable families sunk into relative
obscurity and powerful feudal magnates sprang from the ranks of the local
warrior class. The struggle among these magnates, now referred to as daimyo,
dominated the next phase of Japanese history, known as Sengoku Jidai "Era of
Country at War." Sengoku Period "The Age of Country at War"
1467-1573
This period of warring states was a time when local feudal lords, or daimyo, consolidated territorial domains. The daimyo did this with the force of
arms. He was a power unto himself and his domain was pieced together through
warfare against his neighbors. The Emperor and the Shogun continued to survive
in Kyoto, but on the whole, they had little influence over the independent daimyo. By
the beginning of the 16th century, the country was divided under the control of
200 or 300 daimyo, the most powerful holding areas the size of a whole province.
A few daimyo were descended from the old provincial constable families, but the
majority were of humble origin. Domain boundaries shifted with the fortunes of
war, and daimyo came and went with sudden quickness. Local warriors were now
samurai, serving daimyo as vassals. Loyalty to one's lord, however, was rarely
absolute. It was common during this time for a samurai to switch allegiance and
betray his nominal master for a better deal. Despite this, every daimyo had to rule with and
through his vassals. It was the samurai who fought beside him to protect or
expand his domain. The daimyo began to require samurai to make loyal pledges.
Followers signed or affixed
their personal seals to written oaths of loyalty. This document was effectively
a legal contract sworn before a host of deities. To keep the vassal in service,
the tie was usually cemented by the granting of a fief or stipend from the
daimyo. Rights of income from the land through rent or taxation was replaced by
land itself. The samurai could keep all proceeds of the land and divide it up
among his retainers. He was not allowed to sell his fief, and had to will it to
a single heir. Women who could not fight were forbidden to inherit land. In
exchange for the fief, the samurai had to provide military service to the
daimyo. The vassal had to
be ready to go to war at any time. Depending on the size of the fief, he had to provide so many horsemen,
spears, standard bearers, porters, etc., during times of war. The daimyo made regular inspections of
preparedness. The era was a time of great castle building, and over time daimyo
required their vassals to live close to the castle, rather than on their own
land. The relationship between the daimyo and his samurai was not one-sided.
Vassals who did not accomplish his duties were punished. Daimyo who were not
able to provide protection for his retainers risked losing them. This was an
unstable situation, and it was common for a samurai to leave and go into service
for a rival daimyo that promised a larger fief or stipend. It was not all
about war for the daimyo. They also had to be able administrators of their domain. The daimyo was the last court of appeal for the
people in their domains. The domain was a single jurisdiction with its own laws
and codes, and the daimyo was its chief justice and senior legislator. They
also had to develop and maintain their fief to make the exploitation of
their assets more efficient. To
systemize the collection of taxes, each daimyo took a census and surveyed their
domain for production value. The survey not only helped with the collection of
taxes, it served to record and secure tenureship for the peasants, and helped
achieve stabilization at the local level. The regular collection of taxes
brought the peasantry under the control of the daimyo more than they had been
under the old estate proprietors or the provincial constables. The peasant
village became the basic unit of administration within the domain. The village
was collectively responsible for payment of all the village's taxes, crime
and other offenses, repair of roads and river banks, and other general
maintenance. Aside from non-heir sons who had to go off and seek their own
fortune, and daughters who were married off, the villagers were not allowed to
leave their lands without special permission. These measures allowed the daimyo
to control their domains with a relatively small administrative staff. As
warfare became larger in scale, the daimyo needed to increase the wealth of
their domains. They began to bring new land into cultivation by building complex
irrigation works and constructing embankments to control flooding. Naturally,
the work was done by a levy on the villagers who had to provide the labor,
support, and necessary resources. Daimyo who were fortunate enough to find
deposits of metal ore in their domains, particularly gold, silver, and iron,
mined them with ever-advancing techniques. No matter how much the daimyo
exploited the natural resources of their domains, this by itself did not pay for
all
expenses. Consequently, many daimyo abolished local monopolies and adopted a
policy of free trade within their domains to attract commerce. Daimyo encouraged
merchants to settle in their castle towns, and some were designated official
purveyors, served as quartermasters to supply the daimyo's army, traded local
produce to outside the domain for other goods, and even supervised some of the
domain's financial affairs. As the samurai did not have to pay taxes, they
were relatively isolated from any financial problems that the daimyo may have
had. The samurai became more loyal to their lords and more dependable.
Although this was not always the case, it made it easier for the reunification
of the country in the next phase of feudal Japanese history. Despite the
warring of daimyo among themselves, it was they who had laid the foundation for
the reunification of Japan. The daimyo had created efficient local regimes and
kept the countryside under far better control than either the Imperial
government or the Bakufu had ever been able to do. In addition, Japan was
isolated from her neighbors by the sea and its policy of isolation. It freed her
from foreign interference that might have impeded unification. Conquest from
within was relatively manageable. Unification was accomplished by three men of
humble backgrounds. Their obscurity meant that they started their careers with few
powerful enemies and gave them the advantage of surprise. They took advantage of
the struggles among the larger daimyo and eventually brought them under
their sway. The first of these great unifiers was Oda Nobunaga (1534-82), the
son of a minor daimyo in central Japan. He allied with the enemies of his
enemies, and those that flanked his domain. He eventually consolidated his power
along the road from Kyoto in the west to the Kanto plains in the east. He built
a strong fortified headquarters in Gifu, named after the mountain from which a
legendary ruler had begun his conquest of China. By 1568 Nobunaga had eliminated
enough enemies and took control of Kyoto, ending the Ashikaga Bakufu. Nobunaga
was an astute strategist who chose his enemies carefully and avoided taking on
more than one main rival at a time. He was also careful to consolidate his power
base by granting or confirming the fiefs of his vassals and enemies of his
rivals. His vermilion seal on land grants was a guarantee that he would protect
the holder against rivals. Nobunaga's seal was perhaps the most cardinal
sanction of land rights in the country at the time. This was an extension of the arrangement
that local daimyo had with vassals in their domains. Azuchi-Momoyama Period
1573-1603
Nobunaga's premature and
untimely death by the hands of a traitorous vassal was avenged by his ablest and
most loyal general, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598), a man of so humble an origin
that he was born without a surname. Hideyoshi inherited much of Nobunaga's
domain and won the support of many of his lord's vassals. He built his power
base by issuing land grants to daimyo who swore allegiance to him and conquering
those who did not. Both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi did not seek the total
destruction of most of their enemies. They converted defeated daimyo into an
ally or a vassal. Enemies who became a follower fought for their new lord, and
the lure of rewards from confiscated lands served to bind the arrangement. By
1590 Hideyoshi completed the military unification of
Japan. He received pledges of submission from all the powerful daimyo. All the
land in the country was either part of his direct domain or granted under his
seal to other daimyo. During
his unification campaigns, Hideyoshi carried out extensive land surveys to bring
some order to the chaotic state of landholdings in the country, began minting a
nationwide coinage, confiscated all swords from the peasants, and decreed that
samurai, peasants, and merchants must all remain in their current occupations
and positions. Once Hideyoshi had finished his conquest of Japan, he undertook
a series of ambitious but unsuccessful military campaigns in Korea which left
his coffers and fighting strength depleted. Daimyo who supported the effort
weakened. While
Hideyoshi succeeded in uniting the country militarily, and showed promising signs
that he would undertake administrative innovations, he did not successfully
establish a stable political regime. Tokugawa Shogunate
1603-1868
The final task of political unity was left to Tokugawa Ieyasu, the last of
the great unifiers. Like Nobunaga, he sprang from a relatively minor daimyo
family in central Japan. He had been an ally and vassal of both Nobunaga and
Hideyoshi. After Hideyoshi's military triumph, he assigned Ieyasu command of
the prosperous and strategic Kanto plain, traditionally the the cradle of
conquest in feudal Japan. This made Ieyasu the most powerful daimyo in the
country after Hideyoshi. After Hideyoshi's death it was to Ieyasu that most of
Hideyoshi's former vassals rallied for leadership. With this backing, Ieyasu
began to move against those who were likewise ambitious to assume Hideyoshi's
mantle. In 1600, at the decisive battle of Sekigahara, Ieyasu and his allies
defeated these rivals. In addition to his own considerable domain, he now had at
his disposal the domains confiscated from his defeated enemies. Perhaps a third
of all the productive land in the country was now under his direct personal control
or in the hands of his kinsmen and retainers. Ieyasu held supreme military power; no
one left could challenge the formidable army he could raise from this land. Ieyasu
was a shrewd politician, and took a businesslike view of his military power. He
was determined to establish a dynasty. In 1603 he secured from the Emperor the
title of Shogun, which gave him legal authority over the warrior class, and set
up his Bakufu in Edo (present-day Tokyo). He
dedicated the rest of his life constructing a political framework to perpetuate
the rule of his family, which was to endure for the next two and a half
centuries. Although individually the daimyo were considerably weaker than
Ieyasu's military might, collectively they outnumbered the Tokugawa. Ieyasu
decided to make the daimyo domains the building blocks of the new Bakufu
government and defined the status of the daimyo more precisely than ever before.
The daimyo were defined as those whose landholdings yielded over 10,000 koku of
rice per year. The daimyo were then divided into two groups: the fudai daimyo
were basically made up of those who were allies of Ieyasu during the war against
Hideyoshi's heir; the tozama daimyo were those who allied with the Toyotomi,
but submitted to Ieyasu after the war. The distinction was based principally on
the criterion of political reliability, the fudai daimyo were considered to be
more trustworthy. In addition there was a third group called shinpan which was
made up of heads of Tokugawa branch families, the first of them being Ieyasu's
own sons, and were to provide heirs to the office of Shogun should the main line
not able to do so. All the daimyo were essentially direct vassals of the
Shogun, bound by personal pledges of allegiance. Every daimyo swore his loyalty
to each Shogun upon succession. Upon an heir's succession to daimyohood, he
swore an oath to the Shogun and signed it in blood. In return for his loyalty,
the daimyo held his domain as a fief from the Shogun. Even if his ancestors had
won a domain in the field of battle, it still had to be confirmed by a grant
from the Shogun. The Shogun retained the right to transfer a daimyo from one
domain to another, reduce his landholdings, or to confiscate it entirely.
Indeed, Ieyasu and his first two successors used these powers freely to reduce
the power of the daimyo. Confiscation of domains occurred for three main
reasons. Land, of course, was seized from those defeated in battle. Secondly,
land was confiscated if a daimyo had no heir, and the Bakufu was often very
strict when it came to adopting an heir in the absence of a natural one. During
the reign of the first three Tokugawa shoguns, 57 daimyo clans were dispossessed
for not having an heir, and this happened to all three classes of daimyo.
Lastly, a daimyo's land was reduced or confiscated for breaking the law, disorderly
conduct, or other inappropriate behavior. Significantly, the majority of those
who suffered punitive confiscations were tozama daimyo. By mid-17th century some
two-fifths of the productive land in the country had changed hands from one
daimyo to another, and about one-third of the original tozama daimyo were
completely dispossessed of their land. The Bakufu also wielded its power to
transfer daimyo from one domain to another. It kept the more reliable daimyo
closer to the Bakufu headquarters in Edo, and the less reliable daimyo separate
from each other in the less accessible parts of the country. The Bakufu's direct
domains were consolidated in the Kanto area near Edo, and in all the principal
cities, including the Imperial capital of Kyoto, the commercial center of Osaka,
and the port of Nagasaki. Domains of the fudai daimyo were in the central part
of the country, where they controlled key roads or strategic mountain passes.
The tozama daimyo were relegated to extreme parts of the archipelago, in Kyushu
or in the southwest and northeast regions of Honshu. By mid-17th century few
daimyo clans occupied the same lands they had held at the beginning of the
century, most had been shifted at least once to other locales in order to
establish a geographical balance of power within the Empire. As vassals of
the Shogun, the daimyo had much the same obligations that followers had to their
daimyo in the previous century. Foremost was military service, the requirement
to provide men and arms in time of war or rebellion. A daimyo was required to
keep a standing force in readiness based on the size of his domain. Military
service also required that daimyo assist the Bakufu in the construction of
defensive fortifications. The daimyo had to provide manpower and resources to
help the Bakufu build and expand its headquarters, the great castle at Edo, as
well as similar fortifications at Nagoya and other key stations. This
obligation, whether by design or otherwise, did have the effect of weakening the
daimyo economically. Another major obligation of the daimyo was personal
attendance at the Shogunal Court in Edo. This was a continuation of the
traditional practice of requiring vassals to live in the castle town of their
domain. Sankin Kotai, or alternate attendance system, was official enacted in
1635. It required all daimyo to build and maintain a mansion in Edo to house
their families and a suitable retinue of attendants. The daimyo was required to
alternate his residence each year between the capital and his domain
headquarters, but his family was obliged to remain in Edo, essentially as a
hostage. Sankin Kotai was part
of the Buke Sho-Hatto "Samurai Code" that was a guide for the conduct of the
military class. In addition to Sankin Kotai, the code required the military
class to pursue the arts of war and of peace, abstain from immoral or disorderly
conduct, exercise frugality, not harbor criminals, report seditious activities,
not build new castles or repair military fortifications, or contract marriages
with other daimyo families without the permission of the Bakufu. Under the
influence of Confucian political thought promoted by Ieyasu and his successors,
the Emperor delegated to the Shogun the power to preserve the peace of the realm
and to prevent misgovernment. The Shogun in turn entrusted the daimyo to rule
their domain with his consent. By the end of the17th century, the country was
moving more and more toward a decentralized bureaucratic government. The Bakufu
never exercised full sovereignty. It never imposed a national system of
taxation, raised no mercenary or conscript army, or even attempted to establish
a true national system of law. The individual domain was highly autonomous in
its internal affairs with its own officials and its own regulations. The laws of
the Shogun generally applied only to his own domains and his direct vassals. The
laws of the Bakufu applied to the daimyo but not necessarily to the population of
their domains. The right to adjudicate civil disputes was vested in the holder
of the land, whether he be a daimyo or a minor vassal of the Bakufu. In criminal
cases, the daimyo had full power to arrest, judge, and punish offenders if the
parties involved were registered residents of his domain and so long as the laws
of the daimyo did not conflict with those of the Bakufu. The Bakufu
courts only intervened in cases involving residents of two different domains.
However, a 1615 Bakufu declaration that "in all matters the example set by
Edo is to be followed in all provinces and places" effectively meant that
the daimyo conformed to the examples set by the Bakufu. For the most part, it
was easier for the daimyo to follow precedents made by the Bakufu rather than
innovate their own laws. The Bakufu for its part contented itself with a
supervisory function. It maintained four or five inspectors-general, called
ometsuké, who were charged with making sure that the daimyo observed its
regulations. The Bakufu also dispatched auditing officials, called junkenshi, to
survey and account for the wealth of the domains, their administration and
finances, military strength and readiness, and population size. All this
circumscribed the powers of the daimyo, but it left administrative autonomy in
his hands. For the residents of the domains, it was the daimyo's official rather
than those of the Bakufu with whom they dealt in their daily lives. This
division of the country into so many autonomous and semi-autonomous political
units was accompanied by a proliferation of bureaucratic posts. By the end of the
17th century, Japan was arguably the most thoroughly governed country in the
world. The Bakufu itself had an administrative hierarchy of over 17,000 civil
and military officials, and the daimyo had similar administrative staffs of their
own. At the local level, the more important vassals assisted the daimyo in
making domain policy, while others served as magistrates and judges,
accountants, and town administrators. Lower-level samurai even served as clerks,
tax collectors, record keepers, and storehouse attendants. With few exceptions,
such as village headmen or privileged merchants charged with financial duties,
positions of administration and political responsibility were reserved for the
military class. The growth of feudal bureaucracy was a natural outgrowth of its
position in society. The conversion of the samurai from fighting men into civil
officials was in large part the consequence of peace during the Tokugawa
Shogunate. In 1649 the Bakufu issued regulations that severely limited the
number of retainers a daimyo could keep in training and ready for combat. The
majority of samurai were thus robbed of their vocation. Since they were still
maintained economically by the daimyo, they were pressed into civil service. The
writing brush replaced the sword as the primary tool of the military class. At
the beginning of the 17th century, there were two main ways samurai were granted
incomes. Some retainers, usually the less powerful ones, received stipends in
rice directly from the daimyo's granaries. Others held minor fiefdoms, from which they
collected their own taxes or rents, and whose peasant labor they could
conscript. These fief holders were richer and more powerful than the stipend
receivers. During the 17th century, most daimyo, in order to consolidate their
domains and to increase their tax revenues, began to convert fief holders into
stipend receivers by slowly reducing their powers over the fiefs or by commuting
the fiefs directly into stipends. By the end of the century, perhaps 90 percent
of the daimyo had converted fief holders into stipendiaries. The samurai no
longer lived close to the land and dominated the peasantry directly, they were
residents of castle towns living off income granted at the daimyo's discretion. The
relationship between the daimyo and his vassals was no longer as mutual as it
had been during the era of feudal anarchy. Since the daimyo could increase,
decrease, or take away a retainer's stipend, the tie between the daimyo and
samurai became one-sided and less personal. Loyalty was no longer voluntary, the
pledge of loyalty became an automatic ritual act performed by the vassal because
he had inherited his position from his father. This was regardless of whether the
daimyo was strong or weak, competent or not, benevolent or tyrannical. Loyalty
to the daimyo began turning into patriotism to the domain. The samurai himself
began to change. He was still trained to use the sword, taught the importance of
family honor, and was expected to submit unconditionally to the commands of his
superiors, in the best traditions of Bushido. But it became equally important
for him to learn to read and write and to practice the virtues of self-control,
frugality, and hard work. In a society where he had to serve as an honest and
industrious official, these values were far more essential than those that would
serve him well in the battlefield. Although the samurai was still expected to be
ready to die for his lord in battle, the chances of having to do so were slim. By
the middle of the 17th century, Japanese society was stratified into four main
classes, in the following order of importance: samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants. The samurai class was at the top of
the group as they maintained the necessary social order for everyone.
Right below them were the peasants because they provided the produce necessary
for life. At the bottom of the group were townsfolk and other commoners, including
artisans and merchants, who performed less essential roles. Movement between
classes was forbidden, and any that did were rarely with official sanction. By
the end of the 17th century, on the whole, most men accepted their position in life
and political change in Japan had come to a standstill. The Bakufu's system of
political controls kept the daimyo in check with few opportunities for revolt,
guaranteed incomes to the samurai kept them content, and the continuing
dependence of the Bakufu and the daimyo on agricultural rather than commercial
revenues minimized the potential influence of the ever wealthy merchant class. The
policy of isolation served to minimize outside influences for centuries until
the mid-19th century when it came to an abrupt end. The arrival of Commodore
Perry in 1853 opened Japan to foreigners and ended its relative seclusion from the
rest of the world. Perry's demand that Japan be opened to commerce and normal
diplomatic relations with the outside world provoked a national crisis. The
Shogunate's inability to keep foreigners off the country led to a decline in
confidence and realization that the government was weak, ineffective, and no
longer able to meet the demands of the new era. The weakness of the Bakufu
sparked a long-simmering animosity that Ieyasu and his heirs had feared. In 1868
an alliance of powerful tozama domains, led by Satsuma and Choshu of Kyushu,
carried out a coup d'etat that restored sovereign control to the Emperor and
brought an end to the Tokugawa Shogunate. Ironically, the men who carried out
the Imperial Restoration were interested in protecting the country against
further foreign encroachment, and keeping the feudal system intact. Within a
year or two of the Restoration, however, it became clear that the country could
not afford to preserve its feudal form of government with its conglomeration of
disjointed local daimyo domains. In 1871 the daimyo domains were abolished and
replaced by a system of prefectures governed by centrally-appointed officials. The
new government replaced the stipend paid to samurai with cash payments or
government bonds. Many used these funds to start businesses and participate in
the industrialization of the economy promoted by the government. Many former
samurai also became civil servants, serving as minor officials, army officers,
policemen, and schoolteachers. Indeed, the transition was peaceful and welcomed
by many. Although the samurai lost their social status, in times of
peace they were somewhat frustrated that they were obsolete military men working as civil
servants that had very little to do with their original role as warriors. To
survive in the modern world, Japan quickly abandoned the feudal system,
centralized the government, and modernized the economy and its military. By
1905, Japan, led by descendants of samurai, defeated Russia in the
Russo-Japanese War, the first major victory in the modern era of an Asian power
over a European one.
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